When in Kingston, the compulsion to scour Council documents is almost like muscle memory to me, so before meeting one of my old allies in the pub during my recent visit – not our old regular, the Bricklayers Arms, which was next to the estate but reportedly closed due the the collapse of the community it served – I decided to bring myself up to date by checking the details of the 2026 budget to see if things are as bad as they appear on the ground. Spoiler alert: they are!

Whilst also legitimately mentioning national factors and the rising costs of social care provision as factors in the pressures facing the Borough, the Council’s budget report for 2026/27 makes the following reflection:

“The Council has seen a higher than anticipated number of homelessness approaches, greater than forecast losses of Private Sector Leasing properties and longer lead in times to deliver some of the anticipated mitigating actions. This has resulted in a greater reliance on the use of more expensive Nightly Paid Accommodation (NPA) [my emphasis]”

So, what are the mitigation measures mentioned here? The supposed increased provision of social housing to be delivered by the Cambridge Road Estate Regeneration!

As the ominously bureaucratically titled “variation to project agreements” document published on 17 June 2025 semi-explains,

“The CRE regeneration is governed by a suite of project documents that were agreed and signed by the Council and Countryside Partnerships [countryside partnerships suffered a massive collapse in share price and was then rescued through a buyout by Vistry, which has since suffered a massive collapse in share price], as the two parties to the LLP, on 30 September 2020. The project documents capture the full range of strategic, practical and operational matters which govern the relationship between the parties, the roles and responsibilities on the project and the mechanics of scheme delivery. E. F. These documents have proved to be robust in enabling the regeneration to commence and work on site to progress. However, through the delivery of the first phase, it has become apparent that limited variations are needed to improve the useability of the project documents, add clarity. […]

The Council’s affordable housing and handover requirements – the approved Project Documents for CRE were signed in September 2020, these included a precedent form of agreement for the contract between the LLP and RBK for the delivery of the affordable homes (the Works Agreement). With the first homes in Phase one nearing completion, we have taken the opportunity to review and update the Works Agreement to add clarity to RBK’s requirements, particularly in respect of practical completion and handover. This review also removes requirements that reference certifications that are no longer relevant.

RBK will engage with internal stakeholder and specialist advisers to ensure that this document is updated appropriately, brings clarity to the Council’s expectations and will benefit residents.

[…] The intention from the outset of the joint venture was that the LLP would not be a long term asset-owning company and that the LLP would therefore surrender its lease at an appropriate point. The project documents do not specify the point at which the lease would be surrendered. It is proposed that the LLP lease will be surrendered at the point of sale of the last private dwelling in a Phase (not sub-phase). Phase 1 would be an exception to this – as Phase 1 is split into three distinct parcels, it is proposed that the lease for phases 1a and 1b would be surrendered on the sale of the last private dwelling in these phases, and the lease for phase 1c would be surrendered on the sale of the last private dwelling in phase 1c.”

Readers unfamiliar with corporate bureaucratese might not be able to grasp the serious implications of these passages, so I will try to unpack them for you.

The changes to the LLPs lease are a big deal. Phase one of the development consists of separate tower blocks, and so, in some respects, splitting the handover of the leases for the buildings, enabling their transfer to residents at different times makes sense. However, the truth of the situation becomes clearer when we consider that the handover from the LLP to resident management only takes place once all the properties up for sale have been bought. If demand for the properties was as high as anticipated, and the entirety of phase one was purchased before completion off the catalogue, there would have been no reason to split the handover between the two different buildings and the Council would not have had to add this “clarification” to their paperwork. The reason the Council/LLP has decided to split the handover is very likely because sales of the properties are far lower than anticipated, meaning that, in order to speed up the process and get themselves off the hook for managing and maintaining the blocks as soon as possible, they have decided decouple the handover of the two major development blocks that comprise phase one; as soon as all properties in one block have been sold, the responsibility for managing that building can be handed to residents without the LLP having to wait for the properties in the second block to sell out.

This points to a huge problem: the lack of demand and, consequently, profits. A 2025 Business Plan Update highlights the problems facing the troubled development and explains that sales have been slow:

Assumptions behind the draft Phase 2 Business Plan recognise the challenging sales market that is being experienced in Phase 1 and sales rates for Phase 2 have been adjusted from the previous Business Plan to reflect this. Of the private homes, 159 are designated as private sale, and 2 blocks comprising 117 homes have been identified for a potential forward sale as a private rented portfolio which, if implemented, would reduce the sales exposure and provide the LLP with the required level of confidence to maintain delivery of the programme.

Worse still, the sluggish sales are occurring in a context of rising – higher than predicted – development costs, meaning that, to turn a profit, the developer partnership will have to sell more units at a higher price and quicker pace in a context where demand is far lower than anticipated:

“The LLP has reviewed the overall Business Plan – it has taken into consideration the adverse economic climate and the advice from Arcadis which reports a period of extraordinary build cost inflation which, although now stabilised, is unlikely to fall to previously assumed levels. The risk of further build cost increases on phases 1a and 1b is significantly reduced as construction is well advanced on these sub-phases. However due to delays receiving approval from the Building Safety Regulator for phase 1c, works packages may need to be retendered which may lead to increased costs for this sub-phase. The LLP notes that the combined impact of build cost inflation and recent rises in interest rates results in erosion of the land value and a reduced member profit, albeit still at a level that remains financially viable.”

I should note that some years ago, the Council’s own viability assessment stated that the project was not financially viable. Since then, costs have only increased and projected profits declined, so I am of course interested in how they came to the conclusion that now, in far worse circumstances the project is somehow financially viable!

I should highlight too that the passage on viability refers only to the mostly complete phase 1. Presumably, costs will escalate further for phase 2. To my knowledge, phase 2 has not yet received final planning approval since the submission was made in August 2025. It’s hard to see how it can be given a pass. But this was also true of phase one and the “master plan” as a whole.

The implication of all the setbacks, cost increases and delays is that the development has made the problem it was reportedly designed to solve so much worse. Not only have the demolished properties not yet been replaced/made ready for residents, the new social dwellings will eventually be offered at an increased rent to match the escalating markup of the average property prices on the site, which is necessary for the development to have even a distant hope of breaking even – and that’s just phase one! Meanwhile, the shortfall is being met by increases in council tax for other residents of the Borough, exacerbating an already challenging cost of living crisis. All of this gives at least one clear explanation for the increased levels of homelessness in Kingston: the Cambridge Road Estate “regeneration” scheme.

The scheme is yet another example to cast on the rubble-heap of past failures demonstrating that demolition and rebuild schemes are deeply regressive. If only someone could have predicted exactly the “disaster in slow motion” scenario now unfolding and warned people in advance when it could still be averted; Oh, that’s right, we did! Repeatedly.

Ultimately, our campaign to stop the regeneration failed. Certainly, there are things I would do differently if I were to undertake something similar again. For instance, I would have adopted Pippin, who is now buried in my back garden after he succumbed to cancer, far earlier than I did, so that I could have spent more time with him.

However, I am still very glad we did it. Our criticisms have been stress tested and proven extremely prescient; they have been vindicated by the passage of time and claims that were once considered “scaremongering” by the powers-that-be have become reality. This means that the arguments we made six and more years ago are demonstrably more valid than ever. More importantly, there are still opportunities to avert further disaster. If the authorities want to change direction, there remains the possibility of building more council housing than can be provided by the “regeneration” – and at lower cost – through infill. Pursuing a scheme of infill, low rise and small site development would also provide opportunities for refurbishing existing housing stock. The money could come from the same pot, furnished by loans from the Public Works Loans Board, which increased revenue from a larger number of council houses in the borough would pay back over time.

This alternative plan is still possible because each phase of the Cambridge Road Estate Development contains a break clause. Even now, it is possible for all parties involved to limit the damage by walking away. If the Reserved Matters Application for Phase two hasn’t already been agreed, it shouldn’t be. If a reason is needed to excuse this move, the documents cited above provided a clear one: unanticipated costs impacting the project’s ability to deliver on its stated aims.

Officials who take this course of action might even receive praise for finally doing the right thing. Unfortunately, for now, while my friend Pippin sits comfortably in heaven, Kingston upon Thames remains in purgatory.

*the views expressed here are not necessarily the views of The Kingston Society.